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Despite limited government control over the pre-1914 economy, opposition politicians were 
enthusiastic in blaming bad economic news on the incumbent. In a study of 458 by-elections 
between 1857 and 1914, we find that voters typically gave new governments a ‘honeymoon’ 
but thereafter held them responsible for high unemployment and high prices. Each 1% rise in 
the price level, on average, brought about a 0.21% swing against the government of the day, 
while each one-point rise in the percentage unemployed had double this effect.  Attributing 
shorter-  or  longer-term  memories  to  voters,  as  they  used  the  past  to  determine  what 
constituted unacceptable price and unemployment levels, makes little difference to this result. 
We also look at grievance asymmetry – the idea that voters give government more blame for 
bad outcomes than they give credit for good ones – and find some evidence in its favour. 
 
 
Keywords:  voting, inflation unemployment, Britain, elections 
 














                                                 
1 This research was financed by a grant from the Leverhulme Trust.   2
 
 
ECONOMIC VOTING IN BRITAIN, 1857-1914 
1. Introduction 
The economy is important in the political fortunes of modern governments. This has been 
found in nearly all major western democracies including Britain (Clark et al, 2004), Canada 
(Anderson,  2006), Denmark (Nannestad and Paldam, 1997), Sweden (Jordahl, 2006) and the 
US (Atkeson and Partin 1995; Carsey and Wright, 1998; Hansen 1999; Niemi, Stanley, and 
Vogel 1995; Squire and Fastnow 1994), as well as in cross country data sets that include 
established democracies (Lewis-Beck 1988) and many new democracies from the developing 
and semi-developed world (Wilkin et al, 1997). But the relationship is consistent neither 
across countries nor within countries across time (Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). This has 
led to a vast number of articles and books being written on economic voting, with Lewis-
Beck and Paldam, in a review that is now more than ten years old, citing more than 200 
publications  in  the  field.  Nonetheless,  nearly  all  studies  focus  on  the  post-1945  period. 
Exceptions  include  Bloom  and  Price  (1975)  and  Claggett  (1986),  which  use  U.S. 
congressional election results going back to 1896 and 1866 respectively, as well as Blewett 
(1972) who employs some simple descriptive statistics to analyse the effect of unemployment 
on  by-election  swings  in  Britain  from  1900  to  1910.  There  has,  however,  has  been  no 
comprehensive  statistical  analysis  of  economic  voting  in  pre-1914  Britain:  analysis  of 
nineteenth century British politics has instead tended to focus on the relation between class, 
perceived personal economic interest and the vote (Vincent, 1967; Wald, 1983; Dunbabin, 
1988; Irwin 1994). Yet there have been plenty of suggestions that the level of unemployment 
or prices cost this or that government an election: the Tories in 1868 (Hanham, 1978), the   3
Liberals in 1874 (Maloney, 2005), the Tories in 1880 (Lloyd, 1968; Hanham, 1978; Pugh, 
1982), the Liberals (loss of overall majority) in 1885 (Blewett, 1972), the Unionists in 1892 
(Blewett, 1972) and the Liberals in 1895 (Pelling, 1967; Pugh, 1982; Searle, 2004).  Pelling 
(1967, p.13) goes so far as to say that ‘the working class … was always concerned about 
unemployment and higher prices and … this concern led … to the defeat of any government 
which  sought  a  new  mandate  during  a  period  of  trade  depression.’    Lloyd  (1968,  p.41) 
asserts: ‘No doubt the bulk of voters in 1880 were concerned with simple domestic questions 
concerned with the cost of living and the level of unemployment.’ 
 
2. Literature 
Britain before 1914 had a modern politics at least to the extent that any economic voting was 
historically, geographically and socially relative.  Some governments suffered from slumps or 
benefited from booms more than others. Pelling (1967) argues that the incumbent Liberals 
got particular mileage from the relatively benign economic conditions around the two general 
elections of 1910.  Not only did the Conservative opposition find it harder to make a case for 
a change of government, but their protectionist policies seemed a divisive and unnecessary 
attempt to fix an economy that was not broken. Blewett (1972) argues cogently that not all 
bad economic news was bad political news for the government of the day, even suggesting 
that  the  1903-4  recession  helped  the  incumbent  Unionists  by  succouring  their  man 
Chamberlain’s  protectionist  crusade.  This  is  probably  going  too  far  –  a  more  obvious 
response  from  a  protectionist  voter  would  be  to  blame  the  government  for  not  having 
abrogated  free trade earlier – but it does illustrate that the  electoral effects of  economic 
events, then as now, are unlikely to be straightforward. Blewett actually plots by-election 
swings against unemployment levels, for both the 1900-06 and 1906-10 parliaments. The   4
lack of fit in the first case but much closer correlation in the second does provide some 
support for his hypothesis above. 
 
The  picture  of  the  newly  enfranchised  using  their  vote  to  further  their  personal  or  class 
economic interests – and getting the freedom to do so once the 1872 Ballot Act stopped 
landlords  and  employers  inspecting  their  vote  –  is  acknowledged  on  all  sides  as  far  too 
simple. So it was at the time. John Stuart Mill proved correct in his reassuring prediction, just 
before the 1867 Reform Act, that enfranchised workers would follow too many gods to inflict 
levelling  policies  on  their  betters  (Maloney,  2005,  p.74).  All  this  suggests  that,  if 
macroeconomic  issues  did  indeed  become  more  bound  up  in  voting  as  the  century 
progressed, that might have been due less to the enlarged electorate than to the fact that 
general elections became more general.  Regional issues remained of the utmost importance – 
as the Tories were reminded in 1880 when they fared worst in the regions most damaged by 
the slump in the export trade (Lloyd, 1968, p.149) – but better party organisation and wider 
newspaper readership meant that national economic issues were at least competing with more 
parochial concerns. Again, while ‘influence politics remained powerful’ well into the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century (Nossiter, 1975; Joyce, 1980), the arrival of the secret ballot 
in 1872 did diminish the pressure which employers or landlords could put on a voter. 
 
Vincent (1967) argues that the type of work you did influenced the extent to which you 
would vote economically. ‘Those who were institutionalised and given society by their work’ 
(miners, dockers, workers in large factories) would have more clear-cut material objectives 
than the rest, whose ‘material situation gave no clear lead’ and who, moreover, looked to 
rhetorical and ideological politics to provide them with the dimension of belonging which   5
they lacked in their working lives (pp.43-4).  To ask what the second type ‘hoped to get, say, 
from the election victory of 1880,’ is ‘to ask the wrong question. What they primarily hoped 
to get was the election victory itself, as a visceral thrill and as an assertion of their own 
importance.’ (ibid., p.47).  It is not the purpose of the present study to try and disaggregate 
voters into these two types.  But Vincent’s argument does reinforce the complexity of the 
behaviour we are studying – complexity likely to be evident even at the ‘surface’ electoral 
level. 
 
All the above emphasises how different economic voting patterns can be – across elections, 
across regions and across classes.  Maybe this is all the more reason to try and pick out any 
general pattern that exists, however overlaid by specific factors at specific times and places, 
and this is what we try to do in the current article. 
 
And,  while  our  primary  aim  is  simply  to  establish  whether  economic  voting  existed  in 
nineteenth century Britain, we also seek to address a number of important questions recurrent 
throughout  the  literature  on  economic  voting.  In  particular  we  focus  on  two  issues: 
responsibility and grievance asymmetry.    
 
2.1 Responsibility 
 The fact that voters are concerned about unemployment and the cost of living does not 
necessarily imply that their votes will be affected. Worrying about prices and unemployment 
is not the same thing as blaming the government for them, or thinking that the alternative 
government would make much difference.  Much of the economic voting literature has asked 
exactly  when  voters  will  see  the  government  as  responsible  for  the  economic  situation.   6
Powell and Whitten (1993), and Whitten and Palmer (1999) find that this depends on factors 
such  as  the  number  of  parties  in  the  government  coalition,  whether  there  is  minority 
government  and  whether  the  government  controls  both  the  upper  and  lower  legislative 
chambers.  Both  these  studies  find  that  clarity  of  responsibility  increases  the  effect  of 
economic variables on the vote, while Anderson (2006) demonstrates that this effect is muted 
in  federal  systems  where  voters  are  unsure  whether  to  blame  state  or  national  level 
institutions. Hellwig (2001) concludes that the internationalisation of the economy affects the 
degree to which voters blame national government for weak economic performance (also see 
Fernandez-Albertos (2006)).   
 
How much, or how little, pre-1914 U.K governments had to take responsibility and blame is 
a major issue in the current article.  Between 1857 and 1914 mean government expenditure 
was  10.5%  of  GDP,  compared  with  39.6%  for  the  period  1950  to  2000
1.  Thus  the 
government’s ability to use counter-cyclical policies would have been much reduced even if 
they had adopted Keynesian ideas half a century earlier than they actually did. In addition it 
was well understood that the gold standard tied British prices, at least in the long run, to the 
world’s quantity of money, not that of the U.K.  Neither of these factors, however, exempted 
governments  from  all  responsibility  for  prices  and  employment.  The  more  governments 
disassociated employment from aggregate demand, the freer the voters were to attribute it to 
other things which were within the government’s control, notably its commercial policy.  The 
charge that the friends of free trade were the enemies of employment never went away in the 
Victorian era (Irwin, 1996), flaring up with the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 (Gash, 1972; 
Irwin, 1996), the Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860 (Maloney, 2005), the agricultural 
depression and Fair Trade movement of the 1880’s (Brown, 1943; Eichengreen, 1992) and   7
Joseph Chamberlain’s campaign for tariff reform after 1903 (Sykes, 1979; Irwin, 1994).  The 
political dynamic went the other way when the Liberals in 1880 campaigned on Disraeli’s 
failure  to  remove  tariffs  in  India  on  finished  cotton  imported  from  Britain  and  the 
consequences for jobs in Lancashire (Hanham, 1978, p.322).  
 
Nor did understanding that long-term prices were driven by the gold standard necessarily 
calm voters down with regard to short-term prices – especially those pushed up by indirect 
tax increases – or give the government an alibi in the eyes of those opposed to the gold 
standard in the first place.  From the 1850’s onwards gold was blamed for the violence of 
price fluctuations year-on-year (Sayers, 1933), though Britain still awaits a counterfactual 
study on what would have happened to prices under bimetallism (for the U.S., see Drake 
(1985)).  After  1870  the  gold  standard  was  blamed  not  just  for  fluctuations,  but  for 
fluctuations around a deflationary trend (Nicholson, 1885; Walker, 1896) and, while it never 
became the salient election issue that William Jennings Bryan made of it in the U.S., the Gold 
and Silver Commission of 1886 helped keep it in the public eye.  
 
Certainly, whatever the stance of opposition parties on macroeconomic issues, it did not deter 
them from handing out blame. ‘It is idle for the Chancellor of the Exchequer to say that he 
has not stopped the growth of wealth in the country’ said Gladstone during the Midlothian 
campaign of 1879-80 (Lloyd, 1968, p.58). At the same election, another Liberal candidate 
asked everyone who was earning less, or was employed less often, under Disraeli than they 
had been under the Liberals, to hold up his hand. ‘A large number of people held up their 
hands, and the meeting was a success.’ (ibid., p.149).  
   8
 
 
2.2 Grievance asymmetry 
Grievance asymmetry -- where voters respond differently to economic conditions according 
to whether they are good/improving or bad/deteriorating -- has also a major literature of its 
own.  This  was  first  motivated  by  psychological  research  which  found  that  individuals 
responded  differently  to  positive  and  negative  stimuli.
2  However,  economic  grievance 
asymmetry could also arise from diminishing marginal utility of income. There are two forms 
of grievance asymmetry discussed in the economic voting literature. The first, introduced by 
Mueller (1970), is where voters’ reaction to an economic variable depends on whether it is 
above or below a certain threshold. The problem, as Nannestad and Paldam (1997) observe, 
is that this threshold rate is not known.  
 
The second form of grievance asymmetry was first considered by Bloom and Price (1975). It 
focuses not on whether, say, unemployment is high or low but on whether it is rising or 
falling. This  avoids the problem of thresholds, which might be why far more studies have 
focused on this form of grievance asymmetry, though evidence of its existence is at best 
mixed, with Claggett (1986) and Nannestad and Paldam (1997) for and Lewis-Beck (1988), 
Kiewiet (1983) and Headrick and Lanoue (1991) against.  
 
3. Method  
To test for the presence of economic voting we focus on three economic indicators: prices, 
national  income  and  unemployment.  Our  choice  of  prices  and  unemployment  is  in  part 
because of historians’ belief that voters in specific elections responded to these two, and in   9
part because the vast majority of the economic voting literature also focuses on prices and 
unemployment: the review article by Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) calls them the big two.  
We also include national income as a general measure of economic performance. Our method 
is  based  on  a  first  differences  approach  with  our  dependent  variable  being  swing  to  the 
government. The use of swing, as opposed to the share of the vote gained by the government, 
has  the  significant  advantage  that  it  eliminates  possible  omitted  variable  bias  due  to 
constituency-specific effects that we are unable to observe. It, however, does come with some 
limitations as by adopting swing as our dependent variable we are unable to capture some of 
the  complex  dynamics  of  a  multiparty  political  system.  In  the  context  of  present  study, 
however, we believe these problems are minimal as for the majority of our sample British 
politics was truly a two party system with only a very small percentage of the vote going to 
parties other than the two major ones. It is only in the final three elections, after the birth of 
the Labour party, that any significant share of the vote went to a third party.
3 
 
Using  swing  as  our  dependent  variable  also  makes  the  specification  of  our  econometric 
model somewhat more complicated due to changes in the identity of the government. It is 
therefore worth explaining this in detail.  
 
Let the governing party’s share of the vote at the by-election in constituency i be: 
 
VBi = αi + β j(X jB − Xj*) ∑                                                                          (1) 
 
where αi  is a constituency fixed effect, and represents the vote the government would get in 
that constituency if the economic situation were at the point where it was neither gaining   10
them or losing them votes. For each macroeconomic variable  Xj ,  X *is the level at which 
(ceteris paribus) voters would be evenly split between government and opposition. 
 
Now suppose that the government at the time of the by-election was already in power before 
the last general election. We can thus represent its general election vote in seat i in the same 
way: 
 
VGi = αi + βj(XjG − Xj*) ∑  
 
Hence the increase in the government’s share of the vote (and, in a two-party system, the 
swing to the government) will be: 
 
SBi = βj[(XjB − Xj*)−(XjG − Xj*)]
j ∑  
 
If, however, the current government had been in opposition before the general election, the 
effects of the economic situation on its vote at that general election will be reversed, so that: 
 
SBi = βj[(XjB − Xj*)+(XjG − Xj*)]
j ∑  
 
or, generalising, SBi = βj[(XjB − Xj*)±(XjG − Xj*)]
j ∑                                                   (2) 
where  ±  is positive (negative) when the government at the time of the by-election is in its 
first (second or subsequent) parliamentary term.   11
 
This, however, represents only that part of a by-election swing which might be caused by the 
economy.  We therefore add an intercept – the fact of its being a by-election may affect the 
government vote – and a number of control variables. Is it a government-held seat? Is it a 
majority or minority  government? And what caused the by-election? Hence equation  (2) 
becomes: 
 
SBi = γ + βj[(XjB − Xj*)±(XjG − Xj*)]
j ∑ + ZkBi
k ∑                                                        (3) 
where the Z’s are the control variables 
 
Before we can estimate this, we have to assume values for the X *’s – the values of each 
economic variable at which (ceteris paribus) the electorate would be evenly divided about the 
government. In the case of our first two variables, unemployment and prices, we are unable 
to reject the null that the co-efficient on the time trend is zero. Initially, then, we simply take 
their  average  values  across  the  period  we  are  looking  at.  (Later  we  try  various  moving 
average  formulations  as  an  alternative  description  of  the  way  voters  might  have  formed 
reference values in their minds before evaluating the current situation.)  The third variable, 
national income, is as expected on an upward time trend, and therefore we take the trend 
value  for  each  year  as  our  X*.  Here  *) ( j j X X − is  expressed  as  a  percentage  and  thus 
represents the current output gap.  
 
In a series of by-election swings, regressed on a limited number of macroeconomic variables, 
there is likely to be not only autocorrelation of the residuals, but autocorrelation which is   12
stronger  at  some  times  than  others.  If  some  non-economic  event  lifts  or  depresses  the 
government’s popularity for six months or a year, this will show up as consistently positive 
or negative residuals. At other times no such effect may be present. Such correlation in the 
error  term  while  not  affecting  our  estimates  will  lead  to  biased  standard  errors  and 
consequently may lead to incorrect inference. One option would to include a set of time 
effects to capture these time-variant shocks. However, the inclusion of a complete set of time 
dummies produces problems. Not only would they be collinear with our economic variables 
which are measured on an annual basis, but a large number of dummy variables would also 
significantly reduce the number of degrees of freedom in what is a relatively small sample.  
 
An  alternative  to  the  inclusion  of  time  dummies  is  utilise  cluster-robust  standard  errors. 
These  allow  for  any  form  of  correlation  in  the  error  terms  within  a  specified  group.  
Clustering by time will allow for any autocorrelation in the error term between observations 
within  each  period  that  is  clustered;  it  however  does  not  allow  for  any  autocorrelation 
between  such  periods  (Thompson,  2009).  Clustering  is  not  a  costless  option  as,  while 
expanding the group size helps to eliminate possible bias, it also increases the size of the 
standard errors, which  can equally lead to false inference: in particular it may mean we 
erroneously reject a true null hypothesis (Thompson, 2009). The appropriate period length 
to choose is thus the minimum one that eliminates autocorrelation in the error terms 
of successive periods.  We found this to be a period of one year.  
 
 
4. Data and Variables 
Our data set uses voting data on 458 by-elections that took place between 1857 and 1914 in 
Britain,
4 and, to derive by-election swings, general election results during the same period.   13
Due to the limitations of swing we did not include elections in which a third party (i.e. party 
other than Liberal, Liberal Unionist or Conservative)
5 came first or second.
6 Further, due to 
the complications of calculating swing in multimember districts we exclude all  elections 
where the number of candidates from either of the two main parties is less than the number of 
seats contested. Thus in a two member district we exclude observations where only one 
Unionist or Liberal candidate stands. When we can use double constituencies, we sum the 
vote of the two candidates for each of the main parties.
7  This results in 194 observations 
being dropped. Because the 1884 reform act significantly increased the number of single 
member districts, the majority of our sample is drawn from the post 1884 period.
8  
 
In  addition  to  the  economic  variables  already  mentioned  we  also  include  a  number  of 
political  control  variables.  We  include  a  dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the  seat  is 
currently  held  by  the  government;  a  dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the  incumbent 
government is a minority government; and a set of dummy variables indicating the reason for 
the by-election being held.  
 
Our  data  on  general  election  results  is  drawn  from  the  Society  of  Europe  CD-ROM 
(Caramani, 2000), while our data on by-election results along with the reason for the by- 
election  is  taken  from  Craig  (1974,  77).    Data  on  national  income  was  taken  from  the 
Abstract of British of Historical Statistics (Mitchell, 1988), and data on unemployment from 
Feinstein  (1972),  which  compiles  figures  from  the  trade  union  records  collected  by  the 
Ministry of Labour. While Feinstein is careful to weight each union’s figures by the total 
number employed in the corresponding trade (not just the number in the union) he still warns 
that his figures might over- or under-estimate the unemployment rate as a whole. So far, but   14
only so far, as any such error is consistent, this would do no harm to our own study, which 
works with deviations from trend.  Our prices index is that of O’Donoghue, Goulding and 
Allen (2004), which we normalise to give it a mean value of 100 over our period. This study 
collected prices from two sources. From 1857 to 1870, their preferred index is that compiled 
by  G.H.Wood,  who  derived  his  figures  partly  from  the  Board  of  Trade’s  Report  for 
Wholesale and Retail Prices and partly from his own collection of data from Co-Operative 
Society records. There are questions, especially, over the latter, some of which are described 
by Layton and Crowther (1938) as in the nature of ‘an intelligent guess.’  More reliable are 
the 1870-1947 figures from Feinstein (1972), who calculates a consumer price deflator ‘in a 
form which was as nearly as possible consistent in concept and definition with the then 
Central  Statistical  Office’s  (post-1947)  official  estimates  of  the  National  Accounts.’ 
(O’Donoghue, Goulding and Allen, 2004, p.39).  The principal drawback for our purposes is 
that the figures include the whole of Ireland, though, as this never comprised more than 2 per 
cent of consumers’ expenditure, Feinstein judges this ‘unlikely to have had a significant 
effect on the implied deflator.’ 
 
The fact that we have only annual price and unemployment data to work with is another 
limitation.  If a year began or ended with a sharp upturn or downturn, a January or December 
by-election will not be well served by the annual figures. (It remains important to enter the 
by-election by its month because in some cases this will affect the degree of responsibility we 
are attributing to the incumbent government for the state of the economy.)  However, all 
these factors operate in the direction of concealing, not simulating, significant links between 
the economy and the vote. So far as we do find significant results, we can reasonably plead a 
fortiori.   15
5. Results 
Table 1 shows the results of estimating equation (3) 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Only  the  output  gap  is  significant,  and  only  at  the  10%  level,  though  we  do  find  some 
significant  political  factors  affecting  by-election  performance.  In  their  own  seats, 
governments on average suffered a hostile swing of 4.2% more than in opposition-held seats. 
Minority governments, for some reason, fare better than majority governments. (All minority 
governments during our period are either short-lived Conservative governments during the 
long Whig / Liberal ascendancy of 1846-86, or Liberal governments relying on Irish support 
after the Liberals made the Home Rule issue central.) As regards the reason for calling the 
by-election, we multiply each dummy variable by minus one when it is a by-election in an 
opposition-held seat. Consequently, from ‘peerage’ onwards, the coefficients above measure 
how the reason for the by-election affected not the government vote but the vote of the party 
to which the outgoing MP belonged (presumably the relevant effect if any). ‘Peerage’ covers 
both appointments and successions to the peerage,  and is insignificant. ‘Minister’ covers 
cases of newly-appointed ministers who, under a rule which lasted until 1919, were required 
to stand for re-election. It too comes out as statistically insignificant.  But in other instances 
where MP’s resigned their seat and then stood in the resulting by-election (‘Re-election’), the 
incumbent party in the seat did particularly badly. This was probably because several such 
cases were of MP’s who resigned in order to stand under a different party. Voters thus had to 
choose between deserting the party and deserting the man; no doubt many did the former.   16
Electorates whose choice at the general election was declared void by the courts showed their 
feelings by returning the same party (sometimes the same member) by an increased majority.   
 
But the model so far makes the unlikely assumption that voters hold governments entirely 
responsible for the economic situation from the day they enter office. It is more likely that 
they will gradually shift responsibility from the outgoing to the incoming government as the 
latter’s term of office lengthens. We accommodate this possibility by rewriting equation (1) 
as 
 
VBi =αi + βj[wj(TB)(XjB − X j*)+(1− wj(TB))(Xj *−XjB)]
j ∑                                  (4) 
where  TB is the time that the current government has been in power at the date of the by-
election the by-election and  wj(TB) and (1− wj(TB)) are the weights of responsibility given 
to the new and the old government respectively for variable  Xj at time TB. (Since, so far as 
they  hold  the  old  government  responsible,  voters  reverse  their  political  reaction  to  the 
economic situation, (XjB − X j*) is reversed in the final term.) 
 
And we have to do the same for general elections. The elections of 1885 and 1886 are two 
cases of a government facing the voters a few months after coming to power. It may well be 
the case that the electorate was still blaming or praising their predecessors for some or all of 
the economic situation. By analogy with (4) the appropriate equation is:  
 
VGi =αi + βj[wj(TG)(XjG − Xj*)+(1− wj(TG))(Xj *−XjG)]
j ∑    17
 
so that the swing at the by-election is  
 
SBi = γ + βj (Xj *−XjB)±(Xj *−XjG)+ 2wj(TB)(XjB − Xj*)± 2wj(TG)(XjG − Xj*) { }+ βkZkBi
k ∑
j ∑  
(5) 
 
where,  once  again,  ± is  negative  (positive)  when  the  government  at  the  time  of  the  by-
election had also been in power (had not been in power) before the previous general election; 
and where, once again, we add an intercept and a series of control variables Z.  
 
It  remains  to  find  a  form  for  w(T).  But  if  voters  shift  responsibility  for  each  economic 
variable to the new government at a constant rate (and it is hard to see why they should do 
otherwise), and the new government acquires sole responsibility for variable Xj  after it has 
been in power for duration Tj *, then: 
 
wj(TB) = min(TB /Tj*,1)                                       (6) 
 
Combining this with equation (5) means that we now have to estimate βj and  Tj * for each 
Xj . 
 
Equation (5) involves placing the restriction β2 j = 2β1j∀j on the more general form 
 
 
SBi = γ + β1j (X j *−XjB)± (Xj *−X jG)     + β2 j
j ∑ wj(TB)(XjB − X j*)± wj(TG)(X jG − Xj*)     + βkZkBi
k ∑
j ∑    18
 
To  test  the  validity  of  these  restrictions  we  carry  out  a  series  of  F  tests  comparing  the 
restricted and unrestricted models'
9 goodness of fit. In all specifications presented except one 
we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the restrictions are consistent with the data. 
The single exception is the final regression in table 7, p-value 0.0015. The coefficients of 
interest in this case are, however, not significant at conventional levels and as such this 
failure does not affect our interpretation of the results.  
 
Putting (6) into (5) makes it non-linear. In order to do a linear estimation, we find the Tj *’s, 
and hence wj(T)’s, that minimise the root mean squared error. The macroeconomic variables 
( Xj ) that we estimate in table 2 are again the price level, unemployment and the output gap. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
In column (1), the output gap is insignificant and (presumably) wrongly signed. It is also 
highly collinear with unemployment. Furthermore, we are interested in the overall effect of 
unemployment  on  the  vote,  not  the  effect  of  unemployment  at  a  given  output  gap.  We 
therefore use column (2) for our estimate of the effect of unemployment on the vote and drop 
Output Gap in the rest of our analysis. 
 
Clearly the inclusion of duration effects has precipitated much economic voting lying hidden 
in table 1. Electoral honeymoons are short. It takes a new government only 235 days to be 
held fully responsible for the level of unemployment. After that each one percentage point in 
the unemployment rate produces a 0.42% swing against the government.  Prices become   19
solely the new government’s affair after 273 days in office, and thereafter a one percentage 
point  rise  in  the  price  index  inflicts  a  hostile  swing  of  0.21%  on  the  incumbent.  The 
unemployment figure is significant at the 1% level, the prices figure at 5%.  
 
Given the negative correlation between unemployment and the output gap, it is unsurprising 
that the coefficient on the former should fall when the latter is dropped as a variable. Why the 
coefficient on prices should also fall is harder to explain, but it does not alter the fact that it is 
high prices, not low prices, that voters appear to dislike.  Ideally this calls for disaggregation -
- which voters disliked which high prices? Did occupational groups approve of high prices 
for  the  goods  they  produced  themselves?  However,  our  attempts  to  find  significant 
disaggregated results have been uniformly unsuccessful. Splitting prices up into agricultural 
and industrial components deprives both of statistical significance. Given their strong joint 
significance when put together into the general price index, the interpretation must be that the 
relatively limited data with which we have to work requires a minimum level of aggregation. 
Nor did we get a significant result when we added an interactive variable designed to reveal 
how the agricultural / industrial mix in different constituencies might affect the relationship 
between the price level (or the agricultural price level) and the popularity of the government. 
This  last  is  not  all  that  surprising,  given  the  rough  and  ready  way  we  had  to  estimate 
occupational pattern in each constituency from census data presented at county and borough 
level -- and even this we have only from 1901 onwards, severely limiting our data set.  It is 
disappointing  that  we  cannot  say  more,  but  the  message  that,  overall,  voters  punished 
governments for high prices is strongly significant and – as will be seen shortly – robust to 
different methods of estimation. 
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We now list the 27 by-elections in which, on the basis of the estimated coefficients derived in 
table 2, the winner would have been a different party had prices and unemployment been at 
their mean values. As can be seen, and as one might expect, the issue was usually whether 
governments would lose or manage to hold their seats. (The negative intercept in table 2 
indicates  that  the  fact  of  a  by-election  being  a  by-election  is  disadvantageous  for  the 
government  of  the  day.)    In  six  of  the  27,  however,  the  issue  was  whether  or  not  the 
government  could  gain  a  seat  from  the  opposition.  In  each  case,  the  governing  party  is 
identified. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
So  far  we  have  used  general  election  results  only  to  derive  by-election  swings  and  the 
economic changes that helped to drive them.  Given that, in the context of macroeconomic 
voting, each national general election result counts only as one observation, we do not have a 
large  enough  data  set  to  look  at  the  economic  determinants  of  swings  between  general 
elections.  However, if the state of the economy affects general election voting in the same 
way as it affects by-election voting, we can use our results in table 2 to project what each 
general election result would have been had prices and unemployment been at their average 
level that year.  The ‘if’ may seem a large one. Yet it is not all that easy to see why economic 
motives should operate differently in general elections and by-elections. Undoubtedly voters 
who  are  dissatisfied  with  the  government,  but  still  prefer  it  to  the  opposition,  are  more 
inclined to vote against the government in a by-election when they can make their protest 
without putting the other party into power (Price and Sanders, 1998). But one would expect   21
this effect to show up in the intercept of equation (5) – which is indeed consistently negative. 
It is not obvious that any such effect would alter the coefficients on the economic variables. 
 
All the same, we cannot be certain that it does not do so, and it is thus in a tentative spirit that 
we present our counterfactual exercise. ‘Majority’ here means majority over the other main 
party. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
So the state of the economy did not change the winner in any of these elections. In eight out 
of  the  14,  however,  including  the  five  consecutive  elections  from  1868  to  1886,  the 
incumbent performed worse than it would have in average economic conditions.  The biggest 
gap between the actual and the projected result is in 1868.  The slump of 1866-8 had almost 
exactly coincided with the Derby / Disraeli minority Conservative government.  The figures 
suggest that, even with the economy on an even keel, the Conservatives would have lost (as 
they did every other election between 1841 and 1874) but that the state of the economy 
handed the Liberals another 41 seats. 
 
1868 did not feature the worst conditions under which an election was held. That distinction 
goes to the elections of 1885 and 1886, with unemployment rates of 9.3 and 10.2 percent 
respectively.  However, in both these cases the government had been in power for about five 
months – only just long enough, according to our estimates, for the incumbent to pick up the 
lion’s share of the odium. It is no surprise, therefore, to get an estimate that the economy   22
changed relatively few seats on either occasion but that such change as there was favoured 
the opposition. 
 
A possibility that we have already raised is that voters do not judge governments according to 
whether unemployment and prices are above or below their long-term averages, but rather 
take the past few years, perhaps with the greatest weighting on the most recent ones, as their 
point of reference. In the next section we assume that  Xj * is given by: 
 




∑ Xj,s−t  
 
For  λ  we try the values 0.625, 0.8 and 0.9 because these give the result that 90% of the 
weighting is concentrated in approximately the last 5, 10 and 20 years respectively.   
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Whatever  λ   is  chosen,  high  prices  and  high  unemployment  continue  to  produce  anti-
government swings. Nor does varying  λ  have much effect on their coefficients. The one 
exception is the halving of the coefficient on prices when  λ  is raised from 0.625 to 0.8.  
Exceeding the average of prices over the last five years appears to lose a government more 
support than exceeding the average of prices over the last ten years.  This does suggest that 
governments are judged against a fairly short-term background.  
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But did the strength of economic voting increase or decrease during our period? In particular, 
did the expansion of the electorate in 1867 and then in 1884 produce a new kind of voter 
more (or less) inclined to cast his vote with reference to the state of the economy?  Since the 
1867 Reform Act was principally concerned with borough constituencies, while the 1884 Act 
worked comparable changes  for the  counties,  we have defined  as ‘pre-reform voters’ all 
borough voters up to 1867 and all county electors up to 1884. (In table 6, and the subsequent 
table  7,  coefficients  on  the  political  variables  --  government  seat,  minority  government, 
reason for by-election -- are very little different to those in previous tables and therefore, to 
save space, we omit these variables from our presentation of results.) 
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
 
For pre-reform voters, the coefficients on both unemployment and prices are small, wrongly 
signed and insignificant. It looks as if it was the enlargement of the electorate, first in the 
boroughs and then in the counties, which produced significant economic voting for the first 
time. 
 
A natural next step is to ask if borough and county voters differed per se. The answer is yes, 
as  column  2  of  table  6  shows.  County  voters,  like  pre-reform  voters,  do  not  exhibit 
statistically significant economic voting. 
 
Earlier we were discussing grievance asymmetry, whereby electors hand out more blame to 
the government in bad times than they give it credit in good. We now go on to test the   24
hypothesis  that  voters  respond  more  to  high  unemployment  and  prices  than  to  low 
unemployment and prices 
 
 Let   
VBi = αi + β1jDj1[wj(TB)(XjB − Xj*)+ (1− wj(TB))(Xj *−XjB)]
j ∑




where the dummy variable Dj1  takes the value 1 (Dj2=0) when  XjB > Xj * and 0 (Dj2=1) 
when  XjB < Xj * 
 
Similarly, for the previous general election 
 
 
VGi = αi m β1jDj1[wj(TG)(X jG − Xj*)+ (1− wj(TG))(Xj *−XjG)]
j ∑




Hence our  equation for the swing (again putting in an intercept and  control variables to 
represent non-economic factors) is  
 
SBi = γ + β1jDj1 (Xj *−XjB)± (X j *−XjG)+ 2wj(TB)(XjB − X j*)± 2wj(TG)(X jG − Xj*) { }
j ∑
+ β2 jDj2 (Xj *−XjB)± (Xj *−X jG)+ 2wj(TB)(XjB − Xj*)± 2wj(TG)(XjG − Xj*) { }
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Again we represent w(T) as min(T/T*, 1) and find the Tj *’s which minimise the root mean 
square  error.  The  results  are  in  column  (1)  of  table  7,  and  are  strongly  consistent  with 
grievance  asymmetry.  Not  only  is  the  response  of  the  vote  to  changes  in  prices  and 
unemployment  greater  when  these  variables  are  above  their  long-term  averages,  the 
coefficients on the ‘below average’ variables are insignificant.  
 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
But the question, again, is how voters might form benchmarks for prices and unemployment. 
We therefore again experiment with the moving average formulation 




∑ Xj,s−t  
 
Again we try 0.625, 0.8 and 0.9 as values for λ .  Since the results are very similar in all three 
cases,  we  present  the  results  for  λ =0.8  only  (column  2  of  table  7.)  The  evidence  for 
grievance asymmetry is somewhat weaker in this formulation. Prices now lack a significant 
effect  on  votes  whether  we  take  the  years  of  above-average  or  below-average  prices. 
Unemployment,  by  contrast,  now  always  has  a  significant  effect  on  votes  (though  the 
significance remains greater when it is above average). 
 
Our second form of possible grievance asymmetry was an asymmetric reaction to rising and 
falling variables. We therefore now test the proposition that unemployment and prices do a 
government more harm when they are rising than good when they are falling. Once again we   26
estimate equation (7), but this time Dj1=1 (Dj2=1) means that  Xj  is higher (lower) than it was 
the previous year. 
 
Estimating this gives the results in column 3 of table 7. Rising and falling unemployment 
show  almost  exact  symmetry.  But  the  picture  for  prices  is  unexpected.  Falling  prices 
significantly help the government; rising prices (as opposed to a high level of prices) do not 
significantly  damage  it.    This  runs  counter  to  the  usual  assumption  in  the  grievance 
asymmetry literature that voters will respond more to deteriorating economic conditions than 
improving ones. (If we suddenly and conveniently classify rising prices as improvement and 
falling ones as deterioration, it gets even worse because the signs are now wrong.)  And even 
if we were to take the rest of the literature as too modern to be relevant to Victorian and 
Edwardian voters, there would still be a puzzle here for which we have no ready explanation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The limited power of pre-1914 governments over the economy did not stop politicians of the 
day for taking credit or apportioning blame for the economic picture. Did the voters respond? 
We examine the question by looking at the swings in 458 by-elections between 1857 and 
1914.  Simply  regressing  swings  on  unemployment,  prices  and  national  income  produces 
largely  insignificant  results.  But  once  we  incorporate  the  possibility  that  voters  held  an 
outgoing government responsible for some time into its successor’s term of office, the results 
change  dramatically.  We  estimate  that  it  took  around  a  year  for  voters  to  transfer 
responsibility to a new government and that, after that, each 1% rise in the price level on 
average  caused  a  hostile  swing  of  0.21%,  while  a  one  percentage  point  rise  in  the 
unemployment rate caused a hostile swing of 0.42%. Varying the length of the memories that   27
we  attribute  to  voters  in  choosing  a  reference  point  for  these  two  variables  made  little 
difference to the results. But when we divide constituencies into pre-reform (boroughs up to 
1867 and counties up to 1884) and post-reform, we find that significant economic voting 
derives  entirely from the latter. This casts doubt on the view of some historians that, if 
macroeconomic  affairs  exerted  a  stronger  effect  on  elections  as  the  nineteenth  century 
progressed, that was due more to the increasingly national character of campaigns than to the 
enlarged electorate. We also test for grievance asymmetry – the idea that governments get 
more blame for bad economic news than they get credit for good. There is some evidence that 
existing high unemployment or prices makes voters punish governments particularly hard for 





1 Figures taken from http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/ on 22 April 2010. 
 
2 Bloom and Price (1975) reference a review article (Jordan, 1965) that cites results from a 
number of experiments in which positive attitudes do not affect behaviour to the extent that 
negative  attitudes  do.  Grievance  asymmetry  or  loss  aversion  as  it  is  also  known  is  also 
closely  associated  with  prospect  theory  (Kahneman  and  Tversky,  1979)  and  has  been 
demonstrated in many areas of decision making. 
 
3 For the period 1885-1900 the average share of the total vote in Britain for the Liberals, 
Liberal Unionists and Conservative Party was 98.5%. This fell to 92% for the period 1906-
10.   28
 
4  We  exclude  Irish  constituencies  as  these  constituencies  did  not  reflect  the  political 
dynamics of the remainder of the United Kingdom. 
 
5 Throughout we treat the Conservative party and the Liberal Unionist Party as one party. We 
believe  this  is  reasonable  as  the  Liberal  Unionists  formed  an  informal  coalition  with 
Conservative Party upon their formation in 1886, formed a formal coalition in 1895, and 
finally merged to form the Conservative and Unionist Party in 1912. Further, there are no 
seats in our sample in which a Conservative stood against a Liberal Unionist. 
 
6  This  results  in  14  observations  being  lost.  We  do  include  elections  where  a  Labour 
candidate stood and came third, but found no correlation in such seats between Labour’s 
fortunes and either the state of the economy or the vote for other opposition parties. We 
therefore  conclude  that,  as  far  as  economic  voting  was  concerned,  Britain  up  to  1914 
effectively had a two-party system, which is indeed our justification for using the equations 
we derived in the previous section to test the data. 
 
7 Thus if, for example, in a two member seat three candidates stand from the same party, 
only the two that receive the highest share of the vote will be counted for the purposes of 
calculating the swing. 
 
8 Our sample is also significantly biased towards this latter period because the further you go 
back in time the rarer it is that seats were contested. This is particularly true in county seats 
throughout Britain as well as borough seats in Scotland and Wales.   29
 
9 In the unrestricted model the first and second terms are entered separately and separate 
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Table 2                                     (1)                                 (2) 
Dependent variable:  By-election swing to 
government 
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Table 3   38
Government  lose  seat  to  opposition  due  to 
bad economic situation 
 
Leeds 5/6/57 (Lib) 
Northants South 20/2/58 (Lib) 
Stoke 20/2/68 (Con) 
Bath 7/5/73 (Lib) 
Huddersfield 4/2/93 (Lib) 
Ayr District 30/1/04 (Con) 
Pudsey 20/6/08 (Lib) 
London, Bethnal Green N.W. 19/2/14 (Lib) 
 
Government hold seat due to good economic 
situation 
 
Hastings 6/10/64 (Lib) 
Devonport 22/6/65 (Lib) 
Evesham 9/7/80 (Lib) 
Northampton 4/3/82 (Lib) 
Lanarkshire, Partick 11/2/90 (Con) 
Dorset South 7/5/91 (Con) 
Manchester North-East 8/10/91 (Con) 
Bradford East 10/11/96 (Con) 
Romford 1/2/97 (Con) 
Liverpool Exchange 10/11/97 (Con) 
London, Deptford 15/11/97 (Con) 
London, St.Pancras E. 12/7/99 (Con) 
Edinburgh East 2/2/12 (Lib) 
Government fail to gain seat from opposition 
due to bad economic situation 
 
Lincoln 12/2/62 (Lib) 
King’s Lynn 9/12/69 (Lib) 
Liverpool Exchange 26/1/87 (Con) 
Government gain seat from opposition due to 
good economic situation 
 
Hastings 2/7/83 (Lib) 
Doncaster 23/2/88 (Con) 
Durham 30/6/98 (Con) 
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Liberal  62 
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* with unemployment and prices at their long-term averages 
 
** Incumbent had held power for less than a year 
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                                            λ =0.625                         λ =0.8                            λ =0.9 
Dependent variable:  By-election swing to 
government 
By-election swing to 
government 











































































































2  0.220  0.249  0.247 
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Table 6                                                 (1)                                              (2) 
Dependent variable:  By-election swing to govt.  By-election swing to govt. 
Intercept 
 
Prices pre reform 
 






Unemployment pre reform 
 




















































2  0.238  0.223 
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Table 7                               (1)                                      (2)                                    (3)                                                   
Dependent variable 
 
By-election swing to 
govt. 
By-election swing to 
govt. (moving 
average: λ = 0.8 ) 




Prices (above average) 
 
Prices (below average)  
 
Rise in prices 
 








Rise in unemployment  
 











































































2  0.256  0.249  0.223 
No. of Observations  458  458  458 
 
 